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1. INTRODUCTION
In this study the objectives of official intervention by central banks in
the U.S. dollar - Deutsche Mark exchange market will be examined, in par-
ticular for the short run.l) We will try to determinate empirically the
short term reaction functions with regard to the dollar-DM exchange market
intervention by the Deutsche Bundesbank and~or the Federal Reserve System.
Furthermore, we will study the degree of coordination between the exchange
market interventions of both central banks.
Finally, we will examine the effect of exchange market uncertainty on the
Bundesbank and~or Federal Reserve interventions in the short run.
The points of departure of this empiral study are the following four.
Firstly, the study concentrates on intervention of both central banks in
the spot dollar-DM exchange market. Therefore, we take no account of in-
tervention in the forward dollar-DM exchange market, nor intervention in
member currencies by the Bundesbank as a consequence of the commitments
within the European Monetary System (EMS).2)
Secondly, the study uses daily observations for the official interventions
in the dollar-DM exchange market. In this respect it comprises an empiri-
cal novelty.
Thirdly, the study focuses only on the so-called 'active' intervention
which takes place inside the dollar-DM exchange market and is intended to
influence the spot dollar-DM exchange rate, although it may occasionally
be motivated by a policy of the central bank to build up or replenish its
foreign exchange reserves. Hence, 'passive' intervention which takes place
outside the market is left out of consideration. Examples of such 'pas-
sive' intervention are the purchase of dollars from and compensation pay-
ments for the U.S. army in West Germany by the Bundesbank, the customer
transactions for the U.S. and West German government and the interest
payments on the Bundesbank dollar reserves at the Federal Reserve and on
the Federal Reserve DM-reserves at the Bundesbank.
-------------------------------------------------------
1) The effectiveness of official intervention by central banks in the
dollar - DM exhange market is studied in: Eijffinger 8~ Gruijters (1989).
2) An example of a reaction function for intervention on behalf of the
EMS is given by: Eijffinger (1986), pp. 2~1-2~5 and 293-298.FIGIiRE 1. THE OBJECTIVES OF EXCHANGE MARKET INTEHVENTION BY CENTRAL BANKS (G-7)e)
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attempts to give some leeway to domestic monetary policy and conditions
resisting depreciation~apprecietion because of inflation~competitiveness
attempts to defend rate-level floors or ceilíngs over extended periods
EMS marginal and intramarginal intervention to keep rates wíthin períty bands
attempts to flcquire foreign currences wi[hout depreciation of own currency
dampening seasonslity or offsetting very large transactions
presenting the value of Snternational holdings of assets in domestic currency3
Fourthly, the sample period of this study comprises the Plaza Agreement of
September 1985, the Louvre Accord of February 1987, the Stock Market Crash
of October 198~ and its aftermath.3)
It is our opinion that this period differs essentially from the preceding
period of the early 1980s which has been characterized by a'benign neg-
lect' policy of the Federal Reserve regarding the dollar-DM rate.
2. THE OBJECTIVES OF EXCHANGE MARKET INTERVENTIONS BY CENTRAL BANKS
Before turning to an empirícal study of the short term reaction functions
for daily interventions by the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve, the objec-
tives of exchange market intervention by central banks (G-~ countries) are
examined in general and by the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve in particu-
lar.
Figure 1 summarizes the short term, medium term, long term and other ob-
jectives of interventions by central banks during the period of floating
exchange rates. These objectives are not mutually exclusive and may have
varied ín weight in the course of the period.4)
FiGURR 1
In the short term all central banks have a common objective of "countering
disorderly exchange market conditions" as part of their commitment of
promoting a stable exchange rate system in accordance with Article IV of
the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund as amended in
19~8. "Disorderly market conditions" are supposed to be indicated by a
substantial widening of bid-asked spreads, large intraday exchange rate
movements, "thin" or highly uncertain trading, destabilising impacts of
-------------------------------------------------------
3) An excellent survey of these events and their background is presented
in: Funabashi (1988).
4) This summary draws upon the so-called 'Jurgensen-Report', made by an
experts group from the G-7 countries on exchange market interventions in
these countries: Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention (1983).4
essentially non-economic shocks and self-sustaining exchange rate move-
ments which may gain a momentum of their own ("bandwagon"-effects). The
medium term objectives regard to resisting large short term exchange rate
movements or "erratic fluctuations" which exceed a certain size, buying
time by the central banks to reassess their pol.icies and "leaning against
the wind" which has been pursued by some over short periods and by others
over longer periods. The frequency of this last strategy varies from occa-
sional use in case of "disorderly market conditions" by the Federal Re-
serve System to more regular use by the Bundesbank. The Bundesbank '...
has sought from the onset of floating to counter disorderly market condi-
tions, dampen "erratic" short-term exchange rate fluctuations and smooth
out excessive swings in the DM~US dollar rate over longer periods'.5)
The long term objectives vary from resisting exchange rate movements which
are believed to be unjustified with respect to the fundamentals (infla-
tion, money growth, balance of payments accounts, etc.) and attempts to
give some leeway to monetary policy by lessening the foreign impact on
domestic monetary conditions, to resisting depreciation because of its
inflationary effects and resisting appreciation in order to maintain com-
petitiveness. Other objectives are e.g. attempts to acquire foreign cur-
rencies without generating (renewed) downward pressure on the domestic
currency.
Previous empirical studi.es to reaction functions of the Bundesbank and~or
Federal Reserve6) refer to the longer term objectives of exchange market
intervention and have used monthly or quarterly intervention data. How-
ever, these studies usually ignore or deduct from the short term strategy
of "countering disorderly market conditions" which results in the smooth-
ing of exchange rate volatility from day to day and even during the day.
5) From: Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention (1983), p. 13.
This is confirmed by Gleske (1982): 'Die Interventionen am DM-~ Markt sind
also in erster Linie auf die Gláttung von Kursschwankungen gerichtet' (p.
266). See also Scholl (1983).
6) Examples of such empirical studies are: Artus (1976), Branson,
Halttunen 8~ Masson (19~~), Lehment (1980), Dornbusch (1980), Kbnig 8~ Gaab
(1983) and Neumann (1984). Those studies cover the period of floating
exchange rates from 19~3 up to 1981.On the contrary, our empirical study focuses deliberately on the shorter
term objectives of intervention in the dollar-DM exchange market. As a
consequence of that the study makes use of daily intervention data of the
Bundesbank and Federal Reserve.
The disadvantage of such an approach is the vanishing relation between
intervention and the "fundamentals" which are measured on montly or quar-
terly base. Nevertheless, this approach has an decisive advantage, because
it captures better the frequency and pattern of exchange market interven-
tion with respect to "countering disorder" and "leaning against the wind"
over short periods. Our study is aiming at an explanation of the interven-
tion behaviour of the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve from day to day and
from week to week.
Thereby it should be noticed that the intervention behaviour of central
banks is not only reflected in the direction and volume, but also in the
timing and technique of intervention.~) The timing refers to the question
whether the exchange market is "thin" and uncertain or not, while the
technique relates to the way in which a central bank implements its inter-
vention, i.e. by domestic and possibly foreign commercial banks or by
currency brokers with different announcement effects.
Despite the importance of both timing and technique For intervention be-
haviour, these elements can not be taken into account by our study and
will surely detract from the explanatory power of' the intervention
reaction Functions.
3. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE REACTION FUNCTIONS OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK
AND FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
An empirical study of the reaction functions for daily i nterventions by
the Deutsche Bundesbank and Federal Rcaerve System in the spot U.S. dollar
- Deutsche Mark exchange market must take account of the development of
-------------------------------------------------------
~) This is clearly put by Gleske (1982): "In einer bestimmten Situation
mt5gen bereits geringe Interventionsbetr3ge genUgen, eine unenwi3nschte
Kursenentwicklung zu bremsen oder gar umzukehren. In einer anderen Situa-
tion ktinnen selbst hohe Interventionsbetr~ge das Gegenteil bewirken, wenn
nlmlich die Marktteilnehmer von der Stárke eines Grundtrends iiberzeugt
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the dollar-DM exchange rate between successive days (interday), as well as
in the course of these days (intraday). A complete representation of the
intraday development of the dollar-DM rate would require an infinite num-
ber of observations per day causing technical problems. Therefore, in this
study the intraday development is approximated by three observations per
day:
1. the opening rate (primo) at 8.30 hours;
2. the fixing rate (official middle rate) at 13.00 hours;
3. the closing rate (ultimo) at 16.30 hours in Frankfurt time.
Because the opening and design rates are only available since February
1985,8) as sample is chosen the period from February 1985 until September
1988. Figure 2 gives an example of the intraday changes of the opening and
closing dollar-DM rate from July 198~ to June 1988. This figure shows
observable differences between the rates within the day.
FIGURE 2
Furthermore, the study takes daily observations for the official interven-
tions in the dollar-DM exchange market, which can be divided in two
parts:9)
a. U.S. dollar-interventions of the Deutsche Bundesbank expressed in DMs
against the dollar-DM intervention rate of that day;
b. DM-interventions of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, so far as
these operations affect the net foreign position of the Bundesbank.
This happens e.g. when the Federal Reserve finances its DM-sales by
8) Data for the opening, fixing and closing dollar-DM rate are taken
from: Statistische Beihefte zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundes-
bank, Reihe 5: Die W~hrungen der Welt, Februar 1985 - November 1988,
Tabelle 6: Kassa-Kurse des US dollar in Tagesverlauf.
9) Data for the official interventions of the Bundesbank and Federal
Reserve were kindly provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, Hauptabteilung
Ausland on a confidential base. Therefore, this study comprises no exact
data, nor any figures of these interventions.7
calling on the swap agreement with the Bundesbank or from its DM-balan-
ces at the Bundesbank, or when the Federal Reserve invests its DM-
purchases at the Bundesbank.
Despite of the fact that the sample period (February 1985 - September
1988) consists of 43 months, the majority of these months could not be
used appropriate because of the very few number of interventions per
month.
Consequently, as relevant subsamples have been selected thirteen months,
which comprise at least four interventions by the Bundesbank and~or Feder-
al Reserve each month. This seems an objective criterion. Finally, in this
study the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is taken as estimation
technique.
3.1. Exchange market interventions by the Bundesbank Federal Reserve and
both central banks
The interventions by the Deutsche Bundesbank (INVDBB), the Federal Reserve
System (INVtED) or both central banks (INVtOT) in the U.S. dollar - Deut-
sche Mark exchange market are explained by a constant and the difference
between the opening rate of the dollar in DM (SP) and a n-days moving t
average of the opening rate, fixing rate (St) and closing rate (St) of the
dollar:
(}~-) (-)
(la) INVDBB - a0 } al(SP - 3n ~ SP~n~U) n- 3.5,7
n
(lb) INVtED - b0 ~ bl(SP - 3n ~ SP~nIU)
n- 3.5.7
n
(lc) INV~OT - c0 ~ ~1(SP - 3n ~ SP~n~~) n- 3,5.7
n
with: INVtOT - INVDBB t INVCED
The exchange market interventions of the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve
are both expressed in billions of DMs. The interventions are positive if
the central bank buys dollars in return for DMs and negative if the cen-
tral bank sells dollars for DMs. The dollar-DM rate is defined as the spotTABLE 1. EXCHANGE MARKET INTERVENI'IONS BY THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (DBB)
Equation
(OLS)
INVDBB - a ~ a(SP - 1 E SP~F~U)
t 0 1 t 9 n 1 t-n
(three days moving average)
I~DBB - a t a( t 0 1
(five days moving
SP- 1 L SP,F,U) t 15 n 1
t-n
averagej
INVDBB - a t a(SP- 1 F gp~FIU)
t 0 1 t 21 1 t-n
(seven days moving averagé)
Month a0 a R2 R2 DW a a R2 R2 DW a a R2 R2 DW l 0 l 0 l
September -0.026 ~ 0.642~ 0.320 0.284 0.877 -0.024 ~ 0.630„ 0.525 0.500 1.024 -0.024 „ 0.535. 0.564 0.541 1.101
1985 (-2.22) (2.99) (-z.43) (4.58) (-2.60) (4.96)
October -0.096 ~ -1.802 0.087 0.043 1.141 -0.103 „ -2.154 „ 0.136 0.095 1.197 -0.114 „ -2.282 „ 0.197 0.159 1.241
1985 (-3.80) (-1.41) (-4.07) (-1.82) (-4.42) (-2.27)
October 0.100 -7.349 0.114 0.072 2.390 0.096 -6.112 0.119 0.077 2.348 0.093 -4.396 0.094 0.051 2.310
1986 (1.57) (-1.64) (1.52) (-1.68) (1.45) (-1.48)
January 0.071~ 1.488 0.063 0.014 1.990 0.081„ 1.414 0.088 0.040 2.123 0.102~ 1.755„ 0.151 0.106 2.271
198ï (z.61) (1.13) (2.69) (1.36) (z.99) (1.84)
August -0.026 -2.719 ~ 0.202 0.160 1.785 -0.025 -1.895 ~ 0.183 0.140 1.850 -0.026 -1.585 r 0.194 0.151 1.910
1987 (-1.48) (-2.19) (-1.43) (-2.06) (-1.48) (-2.14)
September 0.021„ -1.827 0.106 0.061 1.495 0.021t -1.977 „ 0.191 0.150 1.608 0.021~ -1.706 „ 0.195 0.155 1.625
1987 (2.21) (-1.54) (2.39) (-2.17) (z.36) (-2.20)
October 0.014 -5.698 „ 0.248 0.210 1.391 -0.006 -5.998 „ 0.377 0.346 1.490 -0.009 -5.430 „ 0.346 0.314 1.464
1987 (0.35) (-2.57) (-0.15) (-3.48) (-0.24) (-3.25)
November 0.043~ -2.940 „ 0.219 0.175 1.639 0.031 -2.798 „ 0.309 0.270 1.834 0.016 -2.756 „ 0.392 0.358 2.058
1987 (1.87) (-z.25) (1.36) (-z.83) (0.70) (-3.41)
December 0.048 -6.193 „ 0.279 0.241 1.227 0.041 -4.920 „ 0.241 0.201 1.270 0.035 -4.408 „ 0.203 0.161 1.216
1987 (1.53) (-z.71) (1.20) (-2.46) (0.93) (-2.20)
January 0.040M -1.233 0.058 0.005 0.922 0.o48w -1.651 0.127 0.078 0.946 0.057. -2.098 ~ 0.203 0.159 1.071
1988 (1.74) (-1.05) (2.07) (-1.62) (2.47) (-2.14)
June -0.106 „ -3.084 0.038 -0.016 1.870 -0.718 -4.463 0.118 0.069 2.095 -0.051 -4.524 „ 0.155 0.108 2.154
1988 (-1.90) (-0.84) (-1.21) (-1.55) (-0.80) (-1.82) July -0.333 . -14.092. o.z84 0.247 2.127 -0.314 i -1z.4o4„ 0.270 o.23z z.194 -0.293 . -11.461„ 0.257 0.218 z.lli
1988 (-5.39) 1-2.75) (-4.89) (-2.65) (-4.31) (-z.56)
August -0.157 , -3.981 0.079 0.035 1.597 -0.155 . -3.669 0.089 0.046 1.585 -0.150 „ -3.26z 0.077 0.033 1-556 1988 (-3.06) (-1.34) (-3.03) (-1.43) (-z.89) (-1.32)8
value of one dollar expressed in DM at the Frankfurt exchange. The open-
ing, fixing and closing exchange rates are taken at 8.30, 13.00 respec-
tively 16.30 hours in Frankfurt time.
The constant (a0, b0 or c0) reflects, when significant, a bias of the
central bank(s) with respect to the dollar-DM rate based on the develop-
ment of the "fundamentals", such as the long capital account, the current
account, the inflation rate and the growth rate of the money stock in West
Germany and the United States.
A positive constant represents an autonomous bias of the central bank(s)
towards a dollar appreciation vis-à-vis the DM and a negative constant a
bias in favor of a dollar depreciation, in the medium (and long) run.10)
The smoothing coefficient (al, bl or cl) reflects the reaction of the
central bank(s) by exchange market interventions on a deviation between
the actual exchange rate - i.e. the opening rate of the day - and the
desired exchange rate. As a proxy for the desired rate is chosen a moving
average of the opening, fixing and closing rates during the previous
three, five or seven days. While the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve are
supposed to pursue a policy of 'leaning against the wind', the smoothing
coefficient is expected to have a negative sign.
This means that the central banks try to smooth the volatility of the
dollar-DM rate in the short run by exchange market intervention.ll)
TABLE 1
Table 1 gives the results of the regressions for the dollar-DM exchange
market ínterventions by the Deutsche Bundesbank on a constant and the
-------------------------------------------------------
10) The constant is a consequence of the monthly or quarterly base of the
data on "fundamentals" (inflation, money growth, balance of payments ac-
counts, etc.). These data would lead to rather sticky regressors for the
"fundamentals" in a daily model of exchange market intervention.
11) However, if the smoothing coefficient unexpectedly has a positive
sign, then the central bank concerned actually reacts by a policy of
'leaning with the wind' and thus amplifies the exchange rate volatility in






- b . b(SP - 1 F SP,F~U) 0 1 t 9 n- 1 t-n
days moving average)
I~FED - b . b(
t 0 1
( five days moving
SP- 1 E SPiF~li)




- b . b(SF - 1 i SP~FI~.1)
0 1 t 21 t-n
days moving averagéjl
Month b0 bl R2 R2 DW b0 bl R2 R2 DW b0 bl R2 R2 DW
September No interventions by FED No interventions by FED No interventions by FED
1985
October No interventions by FED No interventions by FED No interventions by FED
1985
October No interventions by FED No interventions by FED No interventions by FED
1986
January No interventions by FED No interventions by FED No interventions by FED
1987
August -0.071 -3.z61 0.046 -0.004 1.888 -0.074 -2.967 0.072 0.023 1.942 -0.077 - z.744 0.093 0.045 1.990
1987 (- 1.49) (-0.96) ( -1.58) (-1.21) (-1.66) (-1.39)
September No interventions by FED No interventions by FED No interventions by FED
1987
October 0.008 -2.642 ~ 0.188 0.148 1.525 -0.001 -2.827 M 0.296 0.261 1.643 -0.002 -2.469 r 0.253 0.216 1.590
1987 ( 0.38) (-2.15) ( -0.06) (-2.90) (-0.08) (-2.60)
November 0.035 -3.226 „ 0.145 0.097 1.522 0.022 - 3.121 „ 0.211 0.167 1.587 0.010 -2.801 „ 0.223 0.179 1.659
1987 ( 1.10) (-1.74) (0.66) (-2.14) (0.29) (-z.z7)
December 0.063 -4.244 0.101 0.054 0.776 0.046 -4.704 „ 0.171 0.127 0.856 0.037 -4.476 ~ 0.162 0.118 0.826
1987 ( 1.58) (-1.46) ( 1.13) (-1.98) (0.84) (-1.92)
January O.OZ3 0.854 O.OZ4 -0.031 1.866 0.026 0.z49 0.00z -0.053 1.794 0.035 -0.630 0.016 -0.039 1.810
1988 ( 0.91) (0.66) ( 0.96) (0.21) (1.26) (-0.54)
June -0.057 „ 1.150 0.017 -0.038 0.333 -0.039 -0.638 0.008 -0.047 0.462 -0.021 -1.506 0.056 0.003 0.559
1988 (-1.81) (0.56) (- 1.12) (-0.38) (-0.56) (-1.03)
July -0.157 t-12.249„ 0.335 0.3~ 1.163 -0.134 „ -1z.564„ 0.432 0.40z 1.356 -0.110 ~-12.051„0.443 0.413 1.364
1988 ( -3.30) (-3.10) (-2.94) (-3.80) (-z.3z) (-3.89)
nugust -0.166 ~-7.333 . 0.242 o.zo6 1.623 -o.16z „ -7.028 ~ o.z95 0.261 1.666 -0.152 „ -6.265 „0.255 o.z2o 1.617
1988 (-3.39) (-z.59) (-3.41) (-2.96) (-3.09) (-z.68)9
difference between the opening dollar rate and a three, five respectively
seven days moving average of the opening, fixing and closing dollar rat-
es.12) The constant (a0) is for half of the regressions significant, but
always relatively smali. A positive constant reflects a bias of the Bun-
desbank towards a dollar appreciation, a negative constant indicates a
bias in favor of a dollar depreciation vis-à-vis the DM. The smoothing
coefficient (al} has in nearly all regressions the expected, negative sign
and is in general significant, particularly in case of the five and seven
days moving averages. This means that the Bundesbank was trying to smooth
the dollar-DM rate in the short run by intervention.
The adjusted correlation coefficient varies for the five and seven days
moving averages between 0.04 and 0.54, but exceeds mostly 0.15 and some-
times 0.35. This implies that the equations explain on average one fifth
of the Bundesbank interventions.
The Durbin-Watson statistic lies - except for September 1985 and January
1988 - above 1,2 (lower limit) and is usually higher than 1,4 (upper li-
mit), which means that there is generally no first-order autocorrelation
among the residuals.
TABLE 2
Table 2 shows the outcomes of the regressions for the dollar-DM exchange
market interventions by the Federal Reserve System on a constant and the
difference between the opening dollar rate and a three, five respectively
12) The t-values are shown wittiin brackets under the constant and coeffi-
cient(s). An asterisk (') indicates that they are significant at a 95X-
confidence level (critical val~e: 1, 725). Furthermore, the squared mult~-
ple correlation coefficient (R ) idem adjusted for degrees of freedom (R )
and the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) for first-order autocorrelation are






c t c(SP - 1 ï SP,F~D) 0 1 t 9 1 t-n
days moving averagé)
INVTOT - c ~ c(SP- 1 ï SP~F,U) t 0 1 t 15 n 1 t-n
(five days moving averagej
INVTOT t
(seven
- c t c(SP - 1 ï Sp~F~U) 0 1 t 21 t-n
days moving averagéjl
Month c0 cl R2 R2 DW c c R2 R2 DW c c R2 R2 DW 0 l 0 l
September See table 1 See table 1 See table 1
1985
October See table 1 See table 1 See table 1
1985
October See table 1 See table 1 See table 1
1986
January See table 1 See table 1 See table 1
1987
August -0.096 -5.970 0.096 0.048 1.902 -0.099 -4.862 0.118 o.o7z 1.970 -0.103 „-4.3z9 , 0.142 0.097 2.032
1987 (- 1.63) (-1.42) ( -1.70) (-1.59) (-1.79) (-1.77) September See table 1 See table 1 See table 1
1987
October 0.022 -8.340 ,~ 0.232 0.194 1.389 -0.007 -8.826 ~ 0.357 0.325 1.491 -0.011 -7.900 „ 0.321 0.287 1.457
1987 ( 0.37) (-2.46) (-0.12) (-3.33) (-o.i8) (-3.07)
November 0.078 -6.165 „ 0.235 0.192 1.788 0.053 -5.918 „ 0.337 0.300 1.992 0.027 -5.557 . 0.389 0.355 z.193
1987 (1.71) (-2.35) ( 1.17) (-3.02) (0.57) (-3.38) December 0.112„ -10.437„ 0.229 0.189 0.680 0.087 -9.624 „ 0.267 0.229 O.Ï35 0.072 -8.884 „ 0.239 0.199 0.680
1987 ( 1.84) (-z.38) (1.39) (-z.63) ( 1.06) (-2.44)
January 0.063~ -0.379 0.002 -0.053 0.566 0.074~ -1.402 0.041 -0.012 0.546 0.093~ -2.727 ~ 0.155 0.108 0.585 1988 ( 1.79) (-o.zl) (z.04) (-0.88) (2.59) (-1.8z)
June -0.163 .-1.935 0.007 -0.048 1.281 -0.111 -5.101 0.077 0.026 1.510 -0.071 -6.029 0.138 0.091 1.635
1988 (-2.03) (-0.37) (-1.30) (-1.23) (-0.80) (-1.70) July -0.491 „-26.341„ 0.391 0.358 1.767 -0.448 a -24.968„ 0.430 0.400 2.001 -0.403 .-23.513.0.425 0.394 1.931
1988 (-5.39) (-3.49) (-4.94) (-3.78) (-4.z2) (-3.74)
August -0.323 .-11.314„ 0.207 0.169 1.148 -0.317 „ -10.697: 0.245 0.209 1.129 -0.302 „-9.527 „0.212 0.175 1.093
1988 (-3.87) (-2.34) (-3.88) (-2.61) (-3.58) (-z.38)io
seven days moving average of the opening, fixing and closing dollar rat-
es.13) The constant (b0) is rarely significant and relatively poor. A
positive or negative constant reflects a bias of the Federal Reserve to-
wards a dollar appreciation respectively depreciation vi-à-vis the DM. The
smoothing coefficient (bl) has in case of the five and seven days moving
averages almost always the expected, negative sign and is often signifi-
cant. Therefore, the Federal Reserve was aiming too at a policy of 'lean-
ing against the wind', but intervened less than the Bundesbank. The volume
of the Federal Reserve interventions was in general smaller than that of
the Bundesbank interventions. The adjusted correlation coefficient exceeds
for the five and seven days moving averages in most cases 0.12 and is in
July 1988 even more than 0.40. On average the equations explain one tenth
of the Federal Reserve interventions.
The Durbin-Watson statistic is mostly - except for December 198~ and June
1988 - higher than 1.4 (upper limit) and points to no first-order autocor-
relation in these cases. Only in the two months mentioned the residuals
are positively correlated among themselves.
TABLE 3
Table 3 comprises the results of the regressions for the total dollar-DM
exchange market interventions by both central banks on a constant and the
difference between the opening dollar rate and a three, five respectively
seven days moving average of the opening, fixing and closing dollar rat-
es.14) The constant (c0) is sometimes significant and relatively small. It
equals by approximation the sum oF both constants for the individual in-
-------------------------------------------------------
13) No regressions are made for the Federal Reserve interventions in
September and October 1985, October 1986, January and September 198~,
because the number of interventions in these months is less than 4.
14) The regressions for the total interventions in September and October
1985, October 1986, January and September 198~ correspond with the Bundes-
bank interventions in those months (see table 1) because of the lack of
Federal Reserve interventions.11
terventions (a0 f b0) in the corresponding months. The smoothing coeffi-
cient (cl) has always the expected, negative sign and is usually signifi-
cant, in particular for the seven days moving averages. Also, this coeffi-
cient approximates the sum of both smoothing coefficients for the indivi-
dual interventions (al t bl) in the months concerned. The adjusted corre-
lation coefficient exceeds for the five and seven days moving averages
generally 0.20 and in some cases even 0.35. Consequently, the equations
explain on average one fifth of the total interventions and equal the
explanatory power of the equations for the Bundesbank interventions (see
table 1).
The Durbin-Watson statistic lies mostly - except for December 198~, Janu-
ary and August 1988 - above 1.4 (upper limit) and indicates no first-order
autocorrelation in general. In August 1988 the residuals are somewhat
positively correlated, while this was not the case for the regressions of
the individual interventions.
3.2. Coordination of exchange market interventions bv both central banks
In general, t}ie regressions with the difference between the opening rate
and five days moving average (n - 5) proved to be most successful - in the
sense of a statistical fit - for the individual and total interventions.
Therefore, these equations are taken as a point of departure for addition-
al variables or factors. First of all, the interventions of one central
bank are added as an extra explanatory variable to the equation for the
interventions of the other central bank, mutatis mutandis. So, the Bundes-
bank and Federal Reserve interventions are explained by a constant, the
deviation between the opening rate and five days moving average and the
Federal Reserve respectively Bundesbank interventions:
(2a) INVDBB - á}'t)a
(SP - 1(i) SP,F,U) t ai)INVFED n- 5 t 0 1 t 3n n t-n 2 t
(2b) INV~ED - b0 t bl(Sp - 1 E SP,F,U) . b,INVDBB 3n n t-n 2 t n - 5
The coordination coefficient (a2 or b2) reflects the degree of coordina-
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Month a0 ai a2 R2 R2 DW b0 bl b2 R2 R2 DW
September See table 1 No interventions by FED
1985
October See table 1 No interventions by FED
1985
October See table 1 No interventions by FED
1986
January See table 1 No interventions by FED
1987
August -0.010 -1.287 0.205 ~ 0.426 0.362 1.697 -0.038 -0.213 1.454 ~ 0.348 0.276 1.789
1987 (-0.62) (-1.57) (2.76) (-0.88) (-0.09) (2.76)
September See table 1 No interventions by FED
1987
October -0.004 -1.409 1.623 ~ 0.902 0.891 2.793 -0.002 0.284 0.519 ~ 0.889 0.877 2.947
1987 (-0.23) (-1.68) (10.06) (0.19) (0.56) (10.06)
November 0.027 -2.158 ~ 0.205 0.369 0.295 1.555 0.008 -1.928 0.427 0.280 0.195 1.308
1987 (1.17) (-1.98) (1.28) (0.25) (-1.15) (1.28)
December 0.026 -3.383 0.327 ~ 0.355 0.284 1.672 0.027 -2.436 0.461 ~ 0.296 0.217 1.249
1987 (0.78) (-1.62) (1.79) (0.67) (-0.94) (1.79)
January 0.047, -1.661 0.039 0.129 0.026 1.030 0.023 0.335 0.052 0.004 -0.113 1.878
1988 (1.93) (-1.58) (0.19) (0.75) (0.26) (0.19)
June -0.031 -3-790 1.055 r 0.460 0.396 2.182 -0.013 1.003 0.368 ~ 0.393 0.321 0.549
1988 (-0.62) (-1.63) (3.28) (-0.43) (0.69) (3.28)
July -0.249 ~ -6.243 0.490 0.358 0.286 2.060 -0.057 -9.530 ~ 0.245 0.500 0.445 1.222
1988 (-3.33) (-1.04) (1.57) (-0.86) (-2.56) (1.57)
August -0.089 -0.808 0.407 r 0.218 0.140 2.184 -0.107 x -5.748 ~ 0.349 r 0~395 0.334 2.265
1988 (-1.48) (-0.281 (1.82) (-2.00) (-2.44) (1.82)12
central banks try to tune their interventions to each other in order to
strengthen the effectiveness of both interventions. The announcement ef-
fect of coordinated intervention may be greater than the effect of non-
coordinated intervention. If significant, the coordination coefficient
represents to what extent the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve interventions
are correlated.l5) The coefficient is expected to have a positive sign and
will not exceed 1 ín case of equal, simultaneous interventions by both
central banks.
TABLE 4
Table 4 gives the outcomes of the regressions for the dollar-DM exchange
market interventions by the Bundesbank respectively Federal Reserve with
each others interventions as an additional explanatory variable,l6)
The constant (a0 and b0) becomes even less significant for both interven-
tions (see tables 1 and 2). The smoothing coefficient (al and bl) looses
also significance, sometimes considerably, and diminishes, but keeps
mostly the expected, negative sign. Obviously, explanatory power is pulled
away from the smoothing variable.
The coordination coefficient (a2 and b2) has always the expected, positive
sign and is generally significant (exactly the same t-value). This coeffi-
cient varies, when significant, from 0.2 to 1.6 for both interventions and
usually does not exceed 1, except for August and October 198~ due to un-
equal interventions by both central banks. The adjusted correlation coef-
ficient lies in most cases above 0.25. On average the equations "explain"
-------------------------------------------------------
15) However, the causal relation between both interventions is not evident
in practice. It is not clear which central bank leads and which central
bank follows with intervention as a consequence of the daily concertation
procedure between both banks.
16) No regressions are made for the total interventions of both central
banks, because the constant and coefficients proved to be - by approxima-
tion - the sum of the constant and coefficients of the corresponding
regressions for the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve (see tables 1, 2 and
3).13
(see footnote 15) one third of the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve inter-
ventions. The Durbin-Watson statistic is mostly within the range of 1.5 to
2.5 (upper limits) and points to no first-order autocorrelation in gener-
al. Only in June 1988 the residuals are clearly positively correlated for
the Federal Reserve interventions. In two cases the statistic is indeci-
síve.
3.3. Effect of exchange market uncertainty on exchange market interven-
tions
Furthermore, the equation with the difference between the opening rate and
five days moving average as explanatory variable for the exchange market
interventions can be extended with an additional factor representing the
uncertaínty at the dollar-DM exchange market. The degree of exchange mar-
ket uncertainty is approximated by the variance of the opening, fixing and
closing dollar rates in the past five days (an with n- 5). So, the Bun-
desbank, Federal Reserve and total interventions are explained by a con-
stant, the five days moving variance and the deviation between the opening




a0 t a1.6n(SP - 3n . E SP,n~U)
n






c0 t c1.6n(SP - 1. E SP,F,U) n- 5 3n t-n
n
with: 62
-~(SP~F~U - 1 E SP~F~U)2
n t-n 3n t-n
n n
A higher degree of exchange market uncertainty (on) is supposed to provoke
relatively a greater volume of intervention by the Bundesbank, Federal
Reserve or both, either positive or negative. Given their short term ob-
jectives, the central bank(s) then have a greater incentive to react on a
divergence between the actual and desired exchange rate. The smoothing
coefficient adjusted for uncertainty (al, bl or cl) reflects also a policyTABLE 5. EFFECT OF EXCHANGE MARKET UNCERTAINTY ON EXCHANGE MARKET INTERVE,~I'IONS
Equation
(OLS)
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2 P 1 7 P~F~U) - c t c a(5 -- L S 0 1' S t 15 t-n
interventions by bót~ banks)
Month a0 al R2 R2 DW b b R2 R2 DW c c R2 R2 DW 0 l 0 l
September -0.010 , 12.219, 0.875 0.868 1.758 No interventions by FED See interventions by DBB 1985 (-1.85) (11.51)
October -0.096 „ -z19.64 0.029 -0.017 1.141 No interventions by FED See interventions by DBB 1985 (-3.53) (-0.80)
October 0.109 -1462.3 0.064 0.020 2.222 No interventions by FED See interventions by DBB 1986 (1.65) (-1.20)
January 0.071, 148.17 0.100 0.053 2.196 No interventions by FED See interventions by DBB 1987 (2.89) (1.45)
August -o.ozl -196.63 0.031 -0.020 1.729 -0.074 -517.25 0.035 -0.016 1.891 -0.094 -713.88 0.041 -o.ol0 1.874
1987 (-1.03) (-0.78) (-1.48) (-0.83) (-1.48) (-0.90)
September -0.020, -2722.8, 0.160 0.118 1.470 No interventíons by FED See interventions by DBB
1987 (2.24) (-1.95)
October -0.003 -1321.7, 0.600 0.580 1.760 0.002 -585.45„ 0.416 0.387 1.954 -0.001 -1907.1, 0.547 0.524 1.791
1987 (-o.lo) (-5.47) (o.io) (-3.77) (-0.02) (-4.91)
November 0.042, -585.62. 0.212 0.169 1.852 0.028 -771.30, 0.202 0.158 1.575 0.070 -1356.9, 0.278 0.238 1.996
1987 (1.80) (-2.20) (0.90) (-2.14) (1.56) (-2.63)
December 0.052 -1214.5, 0.137 0.092 1.373 0.020 -2417.1, 0.421 0.390 0.896 0.073 -3631.6, 0.355 0.321 0.815
1987 (1.43) (-1.74) (0.59) (-3.71) (1.23) (-3.23) January 0.046, -185.63 0.077 0.026 1.001 0.033 -69.356 0.009 -0.046 1.808 0.079, -254.99 0.066 0.014 0.596 1988 (1.90) (-1.23) (1.20) (-0.41) (2.17) (-1.12)
June -0.058 -1601.1, 0.304 0.265 2.308 -0.019 -617.00, 0.146 0.098 0.637 -0.077 -2218.1, 0.292 0.253 1.793 1988 (-1.20) (-2.80) (-0.65) (-1.75) (-1.13) (-2.73) July -0.360 , -3540.9, 0.136 0.091 2.107 -0.180 „-3835-0„ 0.249 0.210 1.427 -0.540 „-7375.9. 0.232 0.192 1.911 1988 (-5.40) (-1.73) (-3.61) (-2.51) (-5.38) (-2.40)
August -0.169 . -1234.3 0.086 0.042 1.608 -0.187 ,-2227.1, 0.252 0.216 1.685 -0.356 ,-3461.4, 0.218 0.181 1 188 1988 (-3.29) (-1.40) (-3.83) (-2.66) (-4.27) (-2.4z)
.14
of 'leaning against the wind' of the central bank concerned and is expect-
ed to have a negative sign as a consequence of the positive moving varian-
ce. This implies that the Bundesbank and~or the Federal Reserve try to
smooth the volatility of the dollar-DM rate depending the degree of ex-
change market uncerLainty.
TABLE 5
Table 5 shows Lhe results of tt~e regressions for the dollar-DM interven-
tions by the Bundesbank, Federal Reserve respectively both central banks
with the five days moving variance of the opening, fixing and closing
dollar rate as an additional factor to the difference between the opening
dollar rate and a five days moving average.
The constant (a0, b0 and c0) stays relatively small and sometimes signifi-
cant for individual and total interventions (see tables 1, 2 and 3). The
smoothing coefficient adjusted for uncertainty (al, bl and cl) keeps al-
most always the expected, negative signl~) and stays overall mostly signi-
ficant. The coefficient becomes considerably higher because of the moving
variance and gains significance in months with a high level of exchange
market uncertainty, such as October and December 198~ and June 1988 (see
figure 2).
The adjusted correlation coefficient rises in these months with much un-
certainty substantially, but diminishes in months with little uncertainty
(e.g. August 198~). Hence, the equations explain on average one fifth of
the Bundesbank, Federal Reserve and total interventions, which implies
that the explanatory power for the Federal Reserve interventions has doub-
led on average (see table 2). Ttie Durbin-Watson statistic exceeds in most
cases 1.4 (upper limit) and indicates no first-order autocorrelation in
-------------------------------------------------------
17) Evidently, the Bundesbank pursued a policy of 'leaning with the wind'
in September 1985. The equation explains then nearly 90x of the interven-
tions. A closer inspection of the data reveals that the Bundesbank inter-
ventions were guided by other objectives than smoothing - i.e. the devel-
opment of "fundamentals" - as from 22 September 1985, when the Plaza
Agreement was constituted by the G-5.15
general. In this respect the outcomes of the regressions with the moving
variance do not differ much from those without the moving variance.
4. CONCLU5ION
In the previous section an empirical study has been made of the reaction
functions for the dollar-DM exchange market interventions by the Bundes-
bank and~or Federal Reserve in thirteen relevant months during the period
from February 1985 till September 1988. The most important conclusions of
this empirical study are the following.
Firstly, the sometimes significant, but relatively small constant indicat-
es a limited bias of the central banks towards a dollar appreciation or
depreciation vis-à-vis the DM based on the development of the 'fundamen-
tals'.
Secondly, the mostly significant, negative and relatively (very) high
smoothing coefficient points to a policy of 'leaning against the wind' by
both central banks in order to smooth the dollar-DM rate from day to day.
Thirdly, the generally significant, positive and variable coordination
coefficients shows a rather divergent degree of coordination between the
Bundesbank and Federal Reserve on top of a higher frequency of Bundesbank
intervention.
Fourthly, the smoothing coefficient adjusted for exchange market uncer-
taínty becomes more significant in months with much uncertainty and leads
in these months to a higher adjusted correlation coefficient. It appears
that both central banks take full account of exchange market uncertainty
with respect to their intervention 18)
policy.
Finally, the equations explain on average one fifth and in case of a coor-
dination variable one third of the exchange market interventions by the
Bundesbank and~or Federal Reserve. It should be noticed that the equations
-------------------------------------------------------
18) This contradicts the empirical finding of Neumann (1984) that the
Bundesbank intervened - acting like a private investor - for a relatively
smaller scale in the dollar-DM market with rising exchange rate uncertain-
ty. Neumann (1984) estimated reaction functions for the exchange market
interventions by the Bundesbank on a monthly base over the period March
1974 - December 1981.16
without a moving variance of opening, fixing and closing rates are rela-
tively more successful in months with little exchange market uncertainty,
while the equations with the moving variance have more explanatory power
in months with much uncertainty. In the latter case the equations may
explain 40x or more of the exchange market interventions in months with a
high volatility of the dollar-DM exchange rate, e.g. October and December
1987. These general conclusions seem a sound base for future research of
the short term reaction functions of the Deutsche Bundesbank and Federal
Reserve System in the dollar-DM exchange market.17
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